






Bioterrorism: threats and prevention.

Jim McLauchlin
HPA Department of Gastrointestinal Infections, London, UK
jim.mclauchlin@hpa.org.uk
March 2005



Bioterrorism





The deliberate release of a biological toxin or infectious agent to cause infection or economic disruption

History of bioterrorism




Cadavers or animal carcasses used throughout history to contaminate wells, reservoirs, and other water sources.


14th century siege of Kaffa (Foedossia, Ukraine)

plague infected cadavers catapulted into the city outbreak of plague preceded the conquest of the city

1750s Sir Jeffrey Amherst in North America gave small pox infected blankets to "reduce" tribes hostile to the British.



1877 Robert Koch in Germany cultured and observed *Bacillus* anthracis.





1881 Louis Pasteur in France demonstrated a protective anthrax vaccine in sheep

Germany WW1




Well developed biological warfare programme during WW1

Covert release of animal feed contaminated with the causative agents of anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*) and glanders (*Burkholderia mallei*)

Sugar cube discovered in the luggage of Baron Otto von Rosen in Oslo 1917 suspected of being involved with espionage.

Redmond et al. Nature 1998;747-8.



WW2

Germany, Italy, Japan, France, UK, USA an USSR produced and stockpiled biological weapons.

UK *Bacillus anthracis* released on Gruinard Island off West coast of Scotland

Japan battlefield use in China

USA Large programme with production facility starting in 1942 at Fort Detrick (Maryland)

eg 5,000 bombs filled with *B.anthracis* during WW2

USA simulation of release over USA cities using surreptitious release of 'non pathogens' from aircraft (1949-1968)



1972 Biological Weapons Convention



Prevents development, stockpiling of biological and toxic weapons and prohibits their production



Treaty ratified in 1972 by >100 nations including Iraq, and all the members of the UN Security Council (including the USA and USSR)

USAMRIID

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
Medical defences for the US military against potential biological attack

1971-3, destroyed weaponized biological agents produced by US

Military:

Lethal agents

Incapacitating agents

Anticrop agents



Health

Russian post BWC

Large programme

55,000 employed

Various agents including smallpox virus

Outbreak of anthrax in 1979 in Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg)


>100 infections in humans (66 deaths) and cases in livestock up to 50Km downwind of production plant



Dr Ken Alibek

Top scientist in USSR Biowarfare programme,

defected to USA in 1992



Iraq 1990s



Offensive weapons program

B.anthracis, rotavirus, camelpox, aflatoxin, botulinum toxin, mycotoxins and anticrop agents

Deliverability by Scud missile

No evidence for use during Gulf War

Facilities demolished by UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission on Iraq) 1996

Features of potential agents

Health Protection Agency

Infectivity and toxicity
Susceptibility (immunity) of foe and friends

Disease/disruption severity



Very wide range of disease agents available



Category A

greatest potential for large scale dissemination, mass casualties and most requirements for public health preparedness.

Small pox, Anthrax, Plague, Botulism,

Tularemia, Viral Hemorrhagic fevers

Category B

potential for large scale dissemination with resulting illness

Q fever, Brucellosis, Melidosis, Encephalitis, Typhus,

Toxins (Ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxins), Psittacosis,

Enteric diseases from food or water

Category C

Anything else

BAPSU and others





WHO worst case estimates



Casualties from 50 Kg of agent released from an aircraft to a population of 5 million

	Dead	Incapacitated
Anthrax	100,000	250,000
Tularemia	19,000	250,000
Plague	36,000	150,000

Economic effect of Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK

2001 outbreak in the UK NOT a bioterrorist attack

Economic impact to livestock

- ~ 4 million animals culled
- ~ 3 million sheep

Cost £2.75 billion



Production of infectious agents

Growth systems all of which have legitimate uses





some things are easier to hide!

Weaponization processes also have legitimate uses



Reasons for industrial scale production of bacteria:

Enzymes

Antibiotics

Insecticides

Vaccines

Bioterrorism

All may require:


large scale production, stable (viable) preparations, easily dispersed material



Delivery and dispersal of infectious agents









Some things are easier to do!

Who are potential bioterrorists?





Perpetrators of bioterrorism

National organisations

State sponsored

Sophisticated agents and delivery systems

Warfare as motivation

Most likely to be cataclysmic

Microbiologists, chemists, engineers, plus others

Small 'domestic' terrorists

Simple systems (food or water more likely)

Motivations as

Hoaxes, attention, revenge, chaos,

copycat, economic, idealistic, unwell

More likely to be smaller scale

Microbiologists, untrained, inadvertent







Have infectious agents been used for bioterrorism attacks?

Japan Unit 731 1932-1945



Large programme using >3,000 scientists

Various agents developed as offensive weapons

Bacillus anthracis, Neisseria meningitidis, Shigella spp, Vibrio Cholerae and Yersinia pestis.

Release of bacterial cultures and 15 million plague infected

fleas

Contamination of food and water supplies

At least 11 Chinese cities attacked

10,000 casualties in Manchuria



Oregon, USA 1984

Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium gastroenteritis detected in 751 patients

Infection linked to consumption of salad in 10 restaurants

Criminal investigation identified deliberate contamination of salad and coffee creamer by a Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh Commune which had a clinic and laboratory facility where the same Salmonella was recovered.

Török et al., JAMA 1997;278:389-95.






Agency

Japan 1995



Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, 12 killed, 5,000 injured

The cult had also experimented with release of botulinum toxin and anthrax cultures and attempted to obtain ebola virus from Zaire



Texas, USA, 1996.



45 laboratory staff developed severe diarrhoea due to *Shigella dystenteriae*


Cases developed after consumption of muffins and doughnuts anonymously left in the break room

Same strain as laboratory control culture



Kolavic et al., JAMA 1997;278:396-8.

Giardia outbreak by deliberate contamination of water tank, Glasgow 1990



Nine confirmed and 26 suspected cases of giardiasis in a block of flats

Common water-tanks

one with high coliform, *E.coli* and faecal strep counts

Tanks not totally secure and contained a brown faecal deposit with *Giardia* cysts

Deliberate defecation into tank

Ramsey & Marsh. Lancet 1990;336:880-1.

Anthrax in the USA, 2001



22 cases of anthrax detected in Eastern USA between 4th October to 31st December

Florida, New York, Southern Maryland, Northern Virginia, New Jersey and Conneticut

11 cutaneous

11 inhalational (4 deaths)

All due to the same strain of *B.anthracis*

1 additional laboratory acquired cutaneous case



Anthrax in the USA, 2001



Amongst the 22 cases:

20 exposed at work

9 media workers

- 2 inhalational
- 11 postal workers
- 7 inhalational
- 2 exposure could not be identified
- 1 further laboratory acquired case occurred
- probably also infected through letters post exposure antibiotic prophylaxis given to
 - ~10,000 people



Anthrax attack in the USA, 2001




2 envelopes contain powdered *B.anthracis* sent to Government in Washington

1 letter opened on 15th October by Senate staff

B.anthracis found in nasal swabs from 28 staff

2,178 individuals tested

Rapid and widespread prophylaxis given
No anthrax cases identified





Anthrax attack in the USA, 2001



>50,000 environmental samples tested

B.anthracis Ames strain isolated from:

4 powder containing envelopes

15 sites along the mail path

mail boxes, post offices, sorting machines

All isolates indistinguishable from those isolated from

clinical cases

Investigations cost millions of US\$

FBI is offering \$2.5 million reward,

still unclaimed


Bioterrorism attack in the USA, 2001



Each envelope contained ~2g of weoponised B.anthracis Ames strain


This strain isolated from a cow in Texas in 1981 and is probably only available in few laboratories in the USA

Suggestion that the bioterrorist may be an USAMRIID (ex)employee or collaborator



The most common manifestation of bioterrorism is likely to be a hoax







Possible acts of bioterrorism



Scenarios

- •A warning but intervention prevents actual release
- A warning followed by a release
- A covert release without warning
- A hoax

Detection of release

- Non-endemic illness
- Unusual presentations
- Sudden outbreaks
- Unusual distributions
- •Illness in animals
- Information from security services

Coordinating responses to bioterrorist threats



Assessing the threat

Preventing a release

Public protection if there is a release

Managing the consequences of a release

Coordinating responses from:

police, fire, ambulance, local authorities, health authorities and the armed forces

Police coordinated actions on deliberate release



- Decontamination
- Management of casualties including the deceased
- Prevention by shelter or evacuation
- Imposition of a cordon sanitaire
- Media management
- Investigation

Role of health authorities in deliberate release



Confirmation of scale and nature of threat Immunisation, treatment and prophylaxis

Public information

Guidance to health professionals

Laboratory facilities

Training

Bioterrorism in the 21st century



Are we prepared?

